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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
by
David Noteware*
and Craig A. Haynes*

MMEDIATELY after the survey period, the Texas Legislature adopted
a new workers' compensation act that makes extensive reforms in the
present workers' compensation system.1 The new act takes effect January 1, 1991.2 Although the new act will have a drastic impact on workers'
compensation claims, the old act cases will continue for several years to
work their way through the system. This survey, therefore, will, as in years
past, deal with major developments in workers' compensation cases under
the current system.
I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
Federal courts have usually refused to exercise either original or removal
diversity jurisdiction over workers' compensation suits.3 The basis for refus-4
ing to entertain original diversity jurisdiction has been 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
The United States Supreme Court, however, recently recognized that original diversity jurisdiction may exist in actions brought by out-of-state insurers. In Northbrook NationalInsurance v. Brewer5 the Supreme Court held
that federal courts have diversity jurisdiction of suits brought by insurance
carriers against workers' compensation claimants to set aside awards of the
* B.S., University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., University of Texas Law School. Senior
Partner with Thompson & Knight, Dallas, Texas.
**

B.A., Texas Tech University; J.D., University of Texas Law School. Associated with

Thompson & Knight, Dallas, Texas.
1. Texas Workers' Compensation Act, Ch. I § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. law Serv. I (Vernon).
2. Id

3. See authorities cited in footnote 4, infra.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982) provides:
That in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability

insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured
is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the
State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by which the
insurer has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business.
Courts generally applied this provision to deny diversity in the commonly encountered situation where the insurance company was out-of-state, and both the employer and the worker
were residents of the same state. See, eg., Fortson v. St. Paul Fire & Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 1157,
1159 (11th Cir. 19@5); Torres v. Hartford Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 848, 850 (1st Cir. 1978); Hernandez v. Travelers Ins. Co., 489 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
5. 110 S. Ct. 297, 298, 107 L. Ed. 2d 223, 228 (1989).
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Texas Industrial Accident Board (IAB). The court thus concluded that 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c) does not apply to actions brought by insurers, reasoning
that the statute by its terms applies only to actions brought againstinsurers.6
Moreover, the legislative history of the statute did not justify extension of
7
the statute to actions brought by insurers.
Workers' compensation suits originally filed in state courts are not removable to federal courts because 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) imposes a bar to removability.8 In Richardson v. Owens-Illinois Glass Container, Inc., 9 the court held
that an action brought under a Texas statute'0 alleging unlawful discharge in
retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim was properly removed to
federal court on diversity grounds because the action was not one arising
under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act for purposes of Section
1445(c).II The court in Soto v. Tonka Corp. 12 reached the opposite conclusion on similar facts, holding that a suit to recover damages for discharge in
alleged retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim was not removable under Section 1445(c). 13 The Soto court concluded that "[t]he Richard14
son case represents too narrow a view of the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c)."
B.

FederalQuestion Jurisdiction

Attempts by insurers to establish federal question jurisdiction have been
unsuccessful. In Gibbs v. Service Lloyds InsuranceCo. Is a workers' compensation claimant brought a state court action against the insurer, alleging that
the insurer had breached its common law duty of good faith and fair dealing
by mishandling a claim. The insurer removed the case to federal court on
the ground that the action was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).1 6 Several courts have held that suits
6. Md.Because, under Northbrook, an insurer may file an appeal of an award of the
Texas IAB in federal court, but an insurer may not remove an appeal of the IAB award filed
by the claimant in state court, who files first may often determine whether the case is adjudicated in a federal or state forum. Id.
7. Id at 299, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 229 (citing S. Rep. No. 1308, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1964); H.R. Rep. No. 1229, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 2778).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1982) provides: "A civil action in any State court arising under
the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of
the United States." See Olivarez v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 710 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
9. 698 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
10. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § I (Vernon Supp. 1990) provides:
No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer to
represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any
proceeding under the Texas Workmens' Compensation Act, or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding.
11. 698 F. Supp. at 673.
12. 716 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
13. Id. at 978.
14. Id, see also, Wallace v. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.
Tex. 1989) (suit alleging discharge and retaliation for asserting workers' compensation claim
under the Longshoremen and Harborworker's Compensation Act (LHWCA) nonremovable
on diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c)).
15. 711 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Tex. 1989).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-2008 (1974).
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involving benefits under employee group health insurance policies governed
by ERISA are removable to federal court.1 7 The insurer in Gibbs argued
that ERISA governed the workers' compensation plan of the claimant's employer, thereby rendering the case removable. The claimant contended that
the case was not removable in part because ERISA does not apply to any
employee benefit plan "maintained solely for the purpose of complying with
applicable workmen's compensation laws." Is The Gibbs court concluded
that the workers' compensation insurance plan was separately administered
solely to comply with Texas Workmen's Compensation Laws and thus was
squarely within the statutory exemption from ERISA. 19
An employer may seek dismissal of a state claim, once removed to federal
court, on the grounds that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act 20 preempts collective bargaining issues. In Lingle v. Norge Division of
Magic Chef, Inc.,2 1 the Supreme Court, however, held that Section 301
preempts state law only if the court must interpret the collective bargaining
agreement. 22 Accordingly, in Wallace v. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co.,23 a
federal district court held that section 301 did not preempt employees' article 8307c2 4 state court claims for wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing
25
a workers' compensation claim.
II.

APPEAL OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD AWARD

Rulings of the Texas IAB are final and binding unless either party serves
notice of appeal of the award to the Board within twenty days of the award
and files suit to set aside the award within twenty days of giving notice of
appeal. 26 If notice of appeal and filing of suit are timely, the Board award is
17. Eg., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (holding state court suit
filed by worker against his employer's group insurance carrier for group health benefits remov-

able to federal court under ERISA statute). Chlorox Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 779
F.2d 517, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1985) (granting writ of mandamus reversing federal district court's
remand for lack of removability, finding no legislative history of statutory language in ERISA
to prevent removal); Roe v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1983)
(holding ERISA case properly removed).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1982).
19. 711 F. Supp. at 876-79; See also Foust v. City Ins. Co., 704 F. Supp. 752, 753-54
(W.D. Tex. 1989) (holding action brought against workers' compensation insurer for bad faith
failure to pay benefits not governed by ERISA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3)).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
21. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
22. Id at 409-10.
23. 708 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Tex. 1989).
24. See footnote 10,.
25. 708 F. Supp. at 157.
26. TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1990):
Any interested party who is not willing and does not consent to abide by the
final ruling and decision of said Board shall, within twenty (20) days after the
rendition of said final ruling and decision by said Board, file with said Board
notice that be will not abide by said final ruling and decision. And he shall
within twenty (20) days after giving such notice bring suit in the county where
the injury occurred, or in the county where the employee resided at the time the
injury occurred ... to set aside said final ruling and decision ....
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vacated, and the case is tried de novo in the district court. 27 The Fosterv.
Home Indemnity Company28 court imposed the additional requirement of
due diligence in securing service of process in the court proceedings. 29
In Foster, Home Indemnity both timely filed notice of appeal of a 1984
IAB award and instituted suit in district court. Citation, however, was not
served on the claimant, and the suit was eventually dismissed for want of
prosecution. Two years later, the claimant filed suit to mature the IAB
award. Home Indemnity ified a motion for summary judgment claiming
that the IAB ruling was vacated, as it had been appealed timely. The district
court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurer. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment, holding that a material issue of fact
existed as to whether Home Indemnity diligently pursued service of process
on the employee in the 1984 suit.30 The court held that in order to vacate
the award of the IAB, a party must not only file a petition within twenty
days after rendition of the award, but must also have a bona fide intent that
citation be issued and served or that a waiver of citation be obtained and
filed promptly.3 1 The court of appeals held that an issue of fact remained as
to whether Home Indemnity exercised due diligence to secure service of process. 32 In the absence of due diligence, the mere filing of suit would not set
33
aside the IAB award.
In Rather v. Travelers Insurance Co. 34 the district court dismissed an appeal of an IAB award for lack of jurisdiction because the claimant did not
fie. the required law suit within twenty days of the appeal notice to the
IAB. 35 The claimant filed suit twenty-five days after the notice of appeal
was sent to the IAB, but seventeen days after such notice was received by the
IAB. The appellate court reversed, concluding that notice of appeal from an
IAB ruling is filed within the meaning of the statute when it is presented to
the IAB, not when the notice is placed in the mail by the claimant. 36 The
27. Id The statute further provides:
Whenever such suit is brought, the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto
shall be determined by the provisions of this law, and the suit of the injured
employee or person suing on account of the death of such employee shall be
against the Association, if the employer of such injured or deceased employee at
the time of such injury or death was a subscriber as defined in this law. If the
final order of the Board is against the Association, then the Association and not
the employer shall bring suit to set aside said final ruling and decision of the
Board, if it so desires, and the court shall in either event determine the issues in
such cause, instead of the Board, upon trial de novo, and the burden of proof
shall be upon the party claiming compensation.

Id.
28. 757 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).

29. Id at 482-83.
30. Id at 483.
31. Id at 482.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 483.
Id.
769 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
Id at 667-68.

36. Id. at 668; cf Ward v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 909, 910-11 (Tex. 1979)
(holding notice of appeal was timely filed when placed in mail by claimant within twenty days
of IAB ruling, even though notice not received by IAB within twenty days of Board award).
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court thus held that the claimant filed suit within twenty days of the receipt
of the notice of appeal by the IAB, and the district court thereby acquired
37
jurisdiction of the matter.
The Second Injury Fund v. Martinez3 8 court held that a claimant must file
suit against the Second Injury Fund within twenty days after notifying the
39
IAB of his intent to appeal its award in order to recover from the fund. If
the claimant does not file suit against the fund within twenty days after his
notice of appeal, then the district court never acquires jurisdiction
over the
41
Second Injury Fund.4° Moreover, the LAB award becomes final.
III.

INTENTIONAL TOR

The Workers' Compensation Act bars an employee's claims for negligence
against his employer and also any nondeath claims for gross negligence
against the employer.42 The Act, however, does not bar an employee from
suing his employer for intentional torts.43 In Rodriquez v. Naylor Industries,
Inc,44 where an injured worker brought suit against his employer for an
intentional tort, the court held that the employer bears the burden to negate
its intent in a motion for summary judgment proceeding even if the employee raises no fact issue. 45 Rodriguez had an accident while driving his
employer's truck and sustained injuries. Prior to the accident, Rodriguez
alleged that he told his supervisor that the truck had several unsafe tires, but
that the supervisor disregarded his concern and ordered him to drive the
truck.46 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer
on the basis of an affidavit by the employer claiming no intent to harm the
37. 769 S.W.2d at 668-69. The court did not discuss the apparently conflicting holding in
Ward.
38. 756 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988), writ granted, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 178 (Jan.
25, 1989). Writ was granted on two points of error, one of which involved the appellate court
holding that an injured worker must file suit within 20 days of notifying the LAB of intent to
appeal the LAB ruling. Id
39. 756 S.W.2d at 879.
40. I
41. Id
42. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 8306, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990):
The employees of a subscriber and the parents of minor employees shall have no
right of action against their employer or against any agent, servant or employee
of said employer for damages for personal injuries, and the representatives and
beneficiaries of deceased employees shall have no right of action against such
subscribing employer or his agent, servant or employee for damages for injuries
resulting in death, but such employees and their representatives and beneficiaries
shall look for compensation solely to the association, as the same is hereinafter
provided for.
See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (rex. 1983) (holding where employee
suffers intentional tort he may elect to file common law tort action or waive such right and
seek benefits under Workman's Compensation Act, while act provides sole remedy for employer negligence); Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (rex. 1980) (holding article
8306 § 3 bars all common law negligence suits, but Texas Constitution art. I, § 13 guarantees
intentional tort actions).
43. See Massey, 652 S.W.2d at 933.
44. 763 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1989).
45. Id at 413.
46. The supervisor told the employee: "'You damn Mexicans, all you do is just bitch
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worker. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding that an issue of fact remained because the employer could not conclusively negate its own intent.47
IV.

NOTICE ISSUES

The Workers' Compensation Act requires a claimant to file for workers'
compensation benefits within one year of the date of injury, unless good
cause exists for late filing.48 The Act also requires the employer to fie a
report of injury with the IAB after the occurrence of an accident or injury in
the course of employment resulting in the employee's absence from work for
more than one day.4 9 The employer's failure to file the mandatory report
tolls claimant's one year filing requirement. 50
In Masuccio v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. 5 1 parents brought suit as

claimants to set aside a finding by the LAB that their daughter was not acting
in the course and scope of her employment at the time of her death. Their
daughter had attended a business meeting related to her employment in San
Antonio, Texas, that adjourned at 10:15 p.m. At approximately 3:00 a.m.
the next morning, before returning to her home and driving in the opposite
direction from her home, she was involved in a fatal automobile accident.
....

That truck has to go to Port Lavaca and then... to Corpus Monday morning ....

Either take it or walk."' I at 412.
47. Id at 413.
48. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990):
[No proceeding for compensation for injury under this law shall be maintained
...
unless a claim for compensation with respect to such injury shall have been

made within one (1) year after the occurrence of the injury or of the first distinct
manifestation of an occupational disease; or, in case of death of the employee or
in the event of his physical or mental incapacity, within one (1) year after death
or the removal of such physical or mental incapacity. For good cause the Board
may, in meritorious cases, waive the strict compliance with the foregoing limitations as to notice, and the filing of the claim before the Board.
49. TEx. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307 § 7(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990):
Every subscriber shall keep a record of all injuries, fatal or otherwise, sustained
by his employees in the course of their employment. After the occurrence of an
accident resulting in an injury to an employee, causing his absence from work
for more than one (1) day, or after the employee notifies the employer of a definite manifestation of an occupational disease, a written report thereof shall be
made within eight (8) days following the employee's absence from work and
notice thereof to the employer or notice of manifestation of an occupational
disease to the Board on blanks to be procured from the Board for that purpose.
The subscriber shall deliver a copy of the report to the association. Upon the
termination of the incapacity of the injured employee, or if such incapacity extends beyond a period of sixty (60) days, the subscriber shall make a supplemental report upon blanks to be procured for that purpose.
50. Id. The statute further provides:
Where the association or subscriber has been given notice or the association or
subscriber has knowledge of an injury or death of an employee and fails, neglects, or refuses to file a report thereof as required by provisions of Section 7 of
this Article, the limitation in Section 4a of this Article in respect to the filing of a
claim for compensation shall not begin to run against the claim of the injured
employee or his dependents entitled to compensation, or in favor of either the
association or subscriber until such report shall have been furnished as required
by Section 7 of this Article.
51. 770 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
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Almost two years later, the parents filed their claim for workers' compensation benefits. The employer filed no report of injury until eight months after
the parents filed their claim.
The district court granted summary judgment for the insurer on the basis
of claimants' failure to file their claim timely. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded, holding that the employer had a duty to file a report of injury
when the daughter failed to report to work. 52 The court further held that,
where the accident is sufficiently serious to reasonably anticipate a workers'
compensation claim, the one year period for filing a workers' compensation
claim is tolled until the employer files its first report of injury.53 The majority, however, concluded a fact issue remained as to whether the injury occurred in the course and scope of employment.5 The dissent argued that an
accident report was not necessary because the statute requires an employer
to file a report only when the injury occurs in the course and scope of employment. 55 In the dissent's view the injury did not occur within the course
56
and scope of employment as a matter of law.
In Toma v. Ahders57 the worker filed his notice of injury more than two
years and nine months after its occurrence. The LAB denied the claim on
the ground that the evidence failed to establish a compensable injury in the
course of employment. The plaintiff then filed a legal malpractice action
against the attorney who had represented him before the LAB alleging negligent failure to notify him that his claim had been denied or that he had a
right to appeal from the adverse ruling. The trial court rendered summary
judgment against plaintiff finding the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's damages was his failure to file his compensation claim timely. In reversing the
summary judgment and remanding the case, the court of appeals held that
evidence that the employee had relied upon the employer's assurances that
the employer would take care of the claim created a fact issue--whether a
reasonably prudent person of plaintiff's background should have relied on
his employer's representations before filing his own claim. 58
The Workers' Compensation Act requires an employee to give notice to
his employer of a work-related injury within thirty days of the injury as a
prerequisite to making a claim. 59 The notice requirement, however, is sub52. Id at 857.
53. Id at 856-57.
54. Id. at 857, 857 n.3.
55. Id. at 858-59.

56. Id
57. 769 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-El.Paso 1989, writ dism'd).
58. Id.at 616.
59. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990):
Unless the Association or subscriber have notice of the injury, no proceeding for
compensation for injury under this law shall be maintained unless a notice of the
injury shall have been given to the Association or subscriber within thirty (30)
days after the happening of an injury or the first distinct manifestation of an
occupational disease .... For good cause the Board may, in meritorious cases,
waive the strict compliance with the foregoing limitations as to notice, and the
filing of the claim before the Board.
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ject to a good cause exception. 60 The Texas Employers' InsuranceAssociation v. Mathes 61 court examined the form of the notice issues in the jury
charge in a repetitious trauma case with no single date of injury. In such a
case, a court should conditionally submit notice issues on a jury's finding of
total or partial incapacity. 62 The Mathes jury found the employer had not
received notice within thirty days of injury. Nevertheless, the trial court
entered judgment for the worker. The court of appeals reversed and rendered for the insurance company, holding that while the facts evidenced that
the worker had a back condition, had received treatment, and had given
timely notice to the employer of that condition and treatment, the employee
had not provided his employer with the necessary notice that his back condi63
tion was work related.
V.

DISCOVERY/EVIDENCE

A. Discovery of Insurer'sFiles
Courts significantly eroded the party communications privilege" as it applies to confidential communications of the insurer in workers' compensation matters. The Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals 65 court held that
confidential information of an insurer, including information regarding
claim reserves, prepared after the claimant had filed a claim with the IAB
was not privileged from discovery. 66 In this mandamus proceeding Flores
sought investigative reports prepared by a claims supervisor after notice of
injury to the IAB but before appeal to the district court. The evidence at the
hearing for protective order established that the workers' compensation insurer routinely prepared such a report in every case set for pre-hearing conference. The trial court therefore determined that until the notice of appeal
of the IAB award was received, no facts demonstrated that litigation would
60. Id
61. 771 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
62. Id at 229. The Mathes court approved the following language in the charge regarding

notice:

Find from a preponderance of the evidence the date of the first distinct manifestation of [claimant's] back condition.
You are instructed that by first distinct manifestation is meant the time when
a reasonable person, under the same and similar circumstances as [claimant]
would recognize the nature, seriousness, and work related nature of the injury.
Answer by stating the month, day, and year.

Id
63. Id at 230.

64. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(3) provides, in pertinent part:
The following matters are protected from disclosure by privilege:

(d) Party Communications. With the exception of discoverable communications prepared by or for experts, and other discoverable communications, between agents or representatives or the employees of a party to the action or
communications between a party and that party's agents, representatives or employees, when made subsequent to the occurrence or transaction upon which the
suit is based, and in anticipation of the prosecution or defense of the claims
made a part of the pending litigation. For purpose of this paragraph, a photograph is not a communication.
65. 777 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1989).
66. Id at 42.
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ensue, thereby rendering reports prepared in anticipation of the pre-hearing
conference not privileged. Consequently, the supreme court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering production of the records,
and vacated the court of appeals ruling.67 The supreme court further held
that the terms "litigation," "suit," and "lawsuit," as used in Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure 166b(3)(d), did not encompass proceedings before the LAB
and referred only to court proceedings. 68
In Morris v. Texas Employers Insurance Association6 9 the claimant appealed, following an adverse jury verdict, the granting of a protective order
to the insurer. The court held that the mere hiring of an attorney by an
injured worker alone did not justify an insurer's belief that litigation would
necessarily ensue. 70 Because the only evidence offered in support of the protective order was the date of hiring of the claimant's attorney, the court held
that the trial court had abused its discretion in issuing a protective order
based upon the party communications privilege.7 1 The court, however, refused to reverse the jury verdict as the disputed evidence was not made a
part of the record on appeal, and thus could not be evaluated under the
harmless error rule2 2 To preserve error the claimant should have ified a
mandamus action against the trial court requesting the disputed items before
trial 73
B. Failure to Designate Witnesses
In NationalStandardInsurance Co. v. Gayton7 4 the court held that in a
workers' compensation case, a claimant's failure to list treating physicians as
expert witnesses whom he may call at trial in response to the insurer's interrogatories did not preclude admission of medical records prepared by those
physicians." A party need not list as an expert witness the identity of those
treating physicians whose medical records may be offered by affidavit.7 6
In Gee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 77 the supreme court dealt
67. Id
68. Id at 39-42 (6-3 opinion). The report at issue in Fores was printed on a standard

form and contained the following information:
(1) whether there was a question of coverage, claimant's employment, compen.
sable injury, whether the injury occurred in the course and scope of employment; (2) the average weekly wage on the date of the accident; (3) the amount of
temporary total disability paid claimant; (4) any advance payments; (5) whether
the claim had been previously heard at a prehearing conference; (6) summary of
medical findings; (7) whether claimant had returned to work; (8) calculations of
the claimant's injuries; (9) current indemnity reserves; (10) attorney for the
claimant; and (11) claims examiner.
Id at41.
69. 759 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
70. Id at 15.
71. Id at 15-16.
72. Id at 16.
73. Id
74. 773 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ).
75. Id at 77.
76. Id at 76-77 (citing TEx. R. CIV. EVID. 803(6), 902(10)).
77. 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989).
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with the problem of testifying witnesses not disclosed in answers to interrogatories. Prior to trial the insurer filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony from any fact or expert witness not identified by the claimant in
response to interrogatories propounded by the insurer. The trial court overruled the motion and allowed the claimant to present testimony of two undisclosed fact witnesses and two undisclosed expert witnesses. The supreme
court noted that nothing in the record indicated that the claimant had
showed good cause to present the testimony of the undisclosed witnesses,
and thus held that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of those
witnesses. 78 The supreme court further held, however, that all of the improperly admitted testimony was either cumulative or not relevant to the
issues in the case, thereby rendering the trial court's error harmless. 79 The
supreme court remanded the case to the court of appeals to reconsider the
insurer's factual sufficiency points of error.80

VI. DUTY oF GOOD

FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

In Service Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Greenhalgh t the court held that the
duty of good faith and fair dealing created by Aranda v. Insurance Co. of
North America8 2 applied retroactively to cases not yet final when Aranda
was decided.8 3 The insurer in Greenhalgh complained of the court's refusal
to submit its requested issues regarding plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The jury found that the defendant's acts constituting a breach of its duty of
good faith and fair dealing were knowledgeable and malicious. The court
held that, as contributory negligence does not apply to claims based on intentional torts, the trial court did not err in refusing to submit defendant's
84
requested special issues relating to contributory negligence.
VII.

PARTIAL

INCAPACITY AS A DEFENSE

In Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co. v. Garcia 5 the appellate court
stated that, in a workers' compensation case, a trial court is not required to
submit to the jury a defendant's requested jury question on partial incapacity
when asserted as a defense to the plaintiff's claim of total incapacity.8 6 Because partial incapacity is an inferential rebuttal issue, the court noted that a
defendant who pleads it as a defense and presents supportive evidence would
normally be entitled to an instruction on partial incapacity.8 7 The court
held in this case, however, that defendant had waived the right to submission
78. Id at 396.
79. Id. at 396-97.
80. Id at 397.
81. 771 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), writ granted on other grounds, 33 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 110 (Jan. 3, 1990).
82. 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988) (creating legally enforceable duty of good faith and fair

dealing
83.
84.
85.
86.

owing from workers' compensation insurer to worker's compensation claimant).
771 S.W.2d at 212-13 (Aranda decided on March 23, 1988).
771 S.W.2d at 692-93.
758 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
Id at 895.

87. Id.
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of the instruction and definition because it stipulated that the claimant suf-

fered "'total incapacity for some time.' "88 The appellate court, like the
trial court, interpreted the stipulation to mean that only the duration of total
incapacity was at issue in the case.8 9
VIII. PRIOR COMPENSABLE INJURY
The Workers' Compensation Act provides a defense to the insurer to the
extent that it can establish the percentage of claimant's present disability
which is due to a prior compensable injury.9° During the survey period, the
courts struggled with the sufficiency of evidence necessary to support a jury
finding on the prior compensable injury defense. In TransamericanInsurance Co. v. Hernandez91 the trial court disregarded a jury finding that ninety
percent of the plaintiff's present disability was caused by a prior compensable injury and entered judgment for the full amount of benefits. The Corpus
Christi court of appeals affirmed, holding that the insurer had failed to present any competent evidence showing even a percentage range that the preexisting injury contributed to the worker's disability, and thus that the jury
had no competent evidence upon which to base its ninety percent finding. 92
The Eastland court of appeals reached a somewhat inconsistent result in
Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co. v.Martinez.93 The jury in Martinez
found that a prior compensable injury contributed fifty percent to the employee's present total disability. The insurer presented no medical opinion
testimony as to the degree of contribution of the past injury, but did present
lay evidence from the plaintiff and his family regarding disability prior to the
present injury. In addition, the insurer presented expert testimony that
plaintiff was totally disabled following his previous injury. The trial court
disregarded the jury's finding and entered judgment for the claimant based
upon total and permanent disability. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to enter judgment on the verdict, holding
that the insurer was not required to submit medical opinion testimony on the
percentage contribution of the prior injury in order to support the jury finding. 94 Lay testimony from the plaintiff and his family that since the prior
injury plaintiff had been limited in the type of work he could do and had not
88. I
89. Id
90. TEx. REv.Crv. STAT. ANN.art. 8306, § 12c(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990):
If an employee who has suffered a previous injury shall suffer a subsequent injury which results in a condition of incapacity to which both injuries or their
effects have contributed, the association shall be liable because of such injury
only for the compensation to which the subsequent injury would have entitled
the injured employee had there been no previous injury....
See generally Mathis v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 707 S.W.2d 234, 238 (rex. App.-Tyler
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding article 8306 § 12(c) sole limitation on claimant's rights to
double recovery where two injuries cause physical disability).
91. 769 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-.Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
92. Idtat 612.
93. 763 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1989, writ denied).
94. Id at 623-24.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

held a steady job was thus sufficient to support the jury finding. 95
In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Lynn 96 the El Paso court of appeals held that the doctor who treated the claimant after a prior injury could
testify regarding the percentage of current incapacity attributable to the first
injury even though the doctor did not examine or treat the claimant after the
second injury. 97 The appellate court thus reversed the judgment of the trial
court because the trial court refused to submit to the jury the defendant's
proffered jury questions on the incapacity resulting from the prior injury.
The American Motorist decision therefore indicates that a medical expert is
not required to examine the claimant after a second injury in order to render
competent expert testimony on the prior compensable injury defense.
IX.

SUBROGATION: FEE REIMBURSEMENT

The Workers' Compensation Act provides that an insurer has a subrogated interest in the amount it has paid to the claimant out of the first dollars recovered by the claimant in a third party suit.98 As compensation for
bringing the suit the court may award the employee's counsel attorneys' fees
from the insurer's recovery in an amount up to one third of the insurer's
lien. 99 In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hajo 1oo a workers' compensation
insurer intervened in a personal injury case. Upon settlement of the suit, the
law firm representing the plaintiff sought and received attorneys' fees and
out-of-pocket litigation expenses from Aetna's recovery reimbursement.10 1
The court of appeals reversed the award of litigation expenses, holding that,
under the Workers' Compensation Act, the plaintiff has no right to reimbursement for litigation costs from an intervening carrier in a third party
02

action. 1

X. EXCLUsivrrY OF REMEDY
A basic tenet of the Workers' Compensation Act is that the employee
gives up his common law rights to sue his employer for negligence in return
95. Id.
96. 762 S.W.2d 229 ('rex. App.-El Paso 1988, writ denied).
97. Id. at 231-32.
98. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1990). Generally, manufacturers are defendants in such suits.
99. TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
If the association obtains an attorney to actively represent its interests and if the
attorney actively participates in obtaining a recovery, the court shall award and
apportion an attorney's fee allowable out of the association's subrogation recovery between such attorneys taking into account the benefit accruing to the association as a result of each attorney's service, the aggregate of such fees not to
exceed thirty-three and one-third percent (331/3%) of the subrogated interest.
It is well settled that the apportionment of attorneys' fees lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Branton & Menhelsohn, Inc., 670 S.W.2d 699, 703-04
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) (holding article 8307 § 6a(b) allows recovery of attorneys' fees whether fee arrangement contingent or hourly basis).
100. 766 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
101. Id. at 583.
102. Id. at 583-84.
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for speedy and ascertainable compensation for on-the-job injuries regardless
of employer fault.10 3 In Holt v. Preload Technology, Ina 104 the appellate
court rejected an employee's contention that the exclusive remedy provision
of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act was unconstitutional.1 05 The Holt
plaintiff had argued that the exclusivity provision deprives employees of
property without due process of law and violates the open courts provision
10 6
of the Texas Constitution.
In Denison v. HaeberRoofing Co. 107 the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted
to avoid the exclusivity provision claiming he was not an employee. The
plaintiff was a temporary employee who brought an action against his employer for negligence. The employer moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the temporary employee was a "borrowed servant," and as a
workers' compensation subscriber, it could not be liable to the temporary
employee. The district court held that the summary judgment evidence
showed that when the employee was injured, he was under the control of his
temporary employer. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment in
favor of the employer. 108 It held that the focus in determining the status of
employer/employee is on the right of control and not upon whether another
employer may have carried workers' compensation insurance or gratuitously
paid benefits to the employee10 9 The plaintiff also claimed to have raised a
fact question based upon the allegation that the employer refused to accept
responsibility after the worker's fall. The appellate court however held that
post-accident conduct of the employer is irrelevant to determining whether
the employee was under the control of the employer when he sustained the

injury. 10

The Workers' Compensation Act provides that a subscribing employer
has no liability to reimburse or hold other persons harmless on a judgment
or settlement resulting from injury or death of his employee "in the absence
of a written agreement expressly assuming such liability, executed by the
subscriber prior to such injury or death."' 11 In Parkerv. EnsearchCorp. 112
§ 3a (Vernon 1967):
An employee of a subscriber shall be held to have waived his right of action at
common law or under any statute of this State to recover damages for injuries
sustained in the course of his employment if he shall not have given his employer, at the time of his contract of hire, notice in writing that he claimed said

103. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306,

right or if the contract of hire was made before the employer became a subscriber, if the employee shall not have given the said notice within five days of
notice of such subscription.
104. 774 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1989, no writ).
105. Id at 809.
106. Id Tax. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done to him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law".
107. 767 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
108. Id at 866.
109. I
110. I
111. TFx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3(d) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
112. 776 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989), writ granted, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
148 (Nov. 29, 1989).
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the court held that contractual language in which an independent contractor
(employer) indemnified an owner was insufficient to satisfy the exception 113
to
the employer's general immunity under the workers' compensation law.
A wrongful death action was brought against a pipeline owner for the asphyxiation death of the independent contractor's employees while working
on a pipeline. The owner asserted a contractual indemnity claim against the
independent contractor. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the owner on both the wrongful death and indemnity claim. In
reversing the summary judgment on the indemnity claim, the appellate court
held that a contract need not specifically state that it covers injuries to the
indemnitor's own employees nor specifically mention the words "workers'
compensation" to satisfy the exception to the employer's general immunity
under workers' compensation law. 1 4 Rather, the parties' intent as expressed in the contract determines whether the indemnitor has waived general immunity. 115 In this case, the court found that the indemnity contract
contained no provisions indicating an intent by the parties that the indemnitor assume liability for injuries to its employees. 116 Consequently, the indemnitor did not waive its right to immunity under the Workers'
Compensation Act.1 17 The court granted the indemnitor's motion for summary judgment against the owner on the indemnity claim. 118
XI.

COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

The Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation only for injuries
sustained in the course and scope of employment.1 19 If the worker is intoxicated at the time of injury, he is not within the course and scope of employment. 120 March v. Victoria Lloyds Insurance Co. 12 1 involved a workers'
compensation suit for the death of a truck driver who was killed when the
truck he was operating left the highway and crashed. The compensation
carrier denied that the driver was in the course and scope of employment
because he was intoxicated at the time of the fatal accident. The jury found
in favor of the insurance carrier.
On appeal, the court held that the trial court did not err in admitting a
business record affidavit from a toxicologist that established the truck
driver's blood alcohol content was 0.16%.122 The appellate court noted that
the presumption that a worker was injured in the course and scope of employment is rebutted by evidence that the accident occurred while the em113. Id at 649-50.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id
117. Id.
118. Id. at 650.
119. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3(b) (Vernon 1967).
120. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967); Texas Indemnity Ins. Co.
v. Dill, 42 S.W.2d 1059 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931), aff'd, 63 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1933, opinion adopted).
121. 773 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
122. Id.at 787.
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ployee was intoxicated. 12 3 In the face of such evidence, the claimant bears
the burden of proof that he was not intoxicated at the time of injury. 124
When evidence of intoxication is presented at trial, the court should submit
an instruction and definition of intoxication with the course of employment
issue, and the court need not submit a separate jury question on intoxication. 125 The appellate court thus affirmed the take-nothing judgment of the
trial court.126
Director of State Employees Workers' Compensation Division v. Camarata127 involved a workers' compensation suit in which the plaintiff alleged
that his injury was mental trauma arising from his feeling that he had been
unfairly treated on his job. Plaintiff's main complaint concerned a memo
from his supervisor stating that plaintiff had an unusually high rejection rate
for his audit work and that the quality of his reports was not acceptable,
particularly considering the time which plaintiff took to complete the tasks.
1 28
Plaintiff felt that the memo was unfair and inaccurate.
Plaintiff testified at trial that this unfavorable evaluation caused him stress
which led to physical problems, including nocturia, weakness of the legs, low
back pain, blurred vision, loss of sleep, severe anxiety, and sleep problems.
Plaintiff's doctor diagnosed the condition as post traumatic stress syndrome,
the same disorder that affects Vietnam war veterans. The jury found temporary total incapacity. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that mental
trauma can produce an accidental injury under the Workers' Compensation
Act upon proof of a definite time, place, and cause. 12 9 The appellate court
held that the trial court was within its discretion in denying defendant's requested instruction that "'worry and anxiety over job loss is not connected
with what a workman has to do in performance of his contract.' "130
In Sanders v. Texas Employers InsuranceAssociation13 ' a worker who was
injured in a fight with his brother, who was also his supervisor, filed suit for
workers' compensation benefits after he was fired by his brother. The district court rendered summary judgment favoring the insurance company.
On appeal, the court concluded that plaintiff's deposition testimony established that he was fired by his brother immediately prior to the fight.13 2 The
court held that once an employee resigns or is fired an injury occurring at
123. Id at 791.
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id at 792.
127. 768 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).
128. Plaintiff, upset by the memo from his supervisor, struck his fist against some computer
printout paper.
129. I at 429.
130. Id Given the court's analysis, an interesting question is the significance of evidence
bearing upon the truth or falsity of the unfavorable job review. If a worker can suffer a workrelated injury arising from anxiety over receiving an unfair and untrue evaluation report, could
not a worker equally suffer from receiving a true report of unsatisfactory performance? The
Camarata court did not analyze the relevance of evidence relating to the accuracy of the
evaluation.
131. 775 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 1989, no writ).
132. Id at 763-64.
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the job site or while leaving the job site subsequent to the termination is not
an injury sustained in the course of employment within the meaning of the
Workers' Compensation Act as a matter of law.1 33 The court also concluded that the testimony revealed that the basis for the fight was a personal
dispute regarding child support payments.1 34 The court further held that,
pursuant to article 8309, section 1,135 when one employee assaults another
solely from hatred, revenge, or vindictiveness not growing out of or incident
act of the assailto the employment, the injury is attributed to the13voluntary
6
ant and is not within the scope of employment.
In North River Insurance Co. v. Gray137 the plaintiffs sought workers'
compensation benefits on behalf of an employee who suffered a fatal heart
attack while serving as a field maintenance supervisor for an airline. Plaintiffs produced evidence that the worker was under significant mental stress at
the time that he had a heart attack. The evening before his death he had
worked until nearly midnight and returned to work a little before six the
next morning. After lunch the worker collapsed and died while operating a
microfiche machine. The employee's supervisor testified that, while operating the microfiche machine is not physically taxing, at times the operation of
the machine is capable of driving one cross-eyed. The district court awarded
recovery, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered a take nothing judgment. 138 The appellate court held the plaintiff did not prove that the heart
attack was caused by any physical strain and that the evidence failed to trace
the worker's heart attack to any particular event. 139 Plaintiff thus did not
establish an accidental injury in the course and scope of employment as required by the statute.140
In Bordwine v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association 14 1 the appellate
court held that an injury suffered by a worker in the parking lot of the employer's place of business occurred, as a matter of law, in the course and
scope of worker's employment. The appellate court reversed the take-nothing judgment of the district court and remanded it for a new trial. 142 Invoking the access doctrine, the appellate court held that scope of employment
includes employer-prescribed travel routes and nonwork areas in such proximity and relation to work areas as to be, in practical effect, part of the
133. Id The court noted that the rule is not applicable to situations in which the employee
is required or reasonably believes he is required to remain at or return to his employer's prem-

ises for his final paycheck or to execute a duty incident to termination. Id. at 764. This exception did not apply on the facts of this case. Id.
134. Id. at 763-64.
135. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(4) (Vernon 1967) provides that the phrase

"injury sustained in the course of employment" does not include "[a]n injury caused by an act
of a third person intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him and not
directed against him as an employee, or because of his employment."
136. 775 S.W.2d at 763-64.
137. 765 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
138. Id. at 865.
139. I
140. Id.
141. 761 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
142. I at 120.
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14 3
employer's premises.

XII.

Loss OF VISION

In Home Indemnity Co. v. GarciniI" the court held that in evaluating loss
of vision from an eye injury sustained on the job, one must compare the
claimant's pre-injury corrected vision with post-injury uncorrected vision.145
The National Union Fire Insurance Company v. Lucio 46 court had previously held that a worker who had post-accident corrected vision of 20/20
could still recover for loss of vision because his uncorrected vision was
20/400.147 The worker in Garcinihad 20/200 uncorrected vision prior to
injury (legally blind), but 20/20 corrected vision. The insurer in Garcini
argued that the worker could not recover because he was legally blind prior
to the accident, relying upon the Lucio court's application of uncorrected
vision to the worker in that case. In rejecting the insurer's argument, the
Garcinicourt held that the 20/20 pre-injury corrected vision should be compared to the total blindness caused post-injury.1 48 The court affirmed the
jury verdict in favor of the claimant.' 49
XIII.

CONCLUSION

The most significant decisions rendered during the survey period were
Northbrook and Flores. In Northbrook, the United States Supreme Court
recognized original diversity jurisdiction of workers' compensation suits filed
by out-of-state insurers. In Flores, the Texas Supreme Court drastically
eroded the ability of insurers to protect their confidential claims investigation files developed during LAB proceedings from discovery in a subsequent
lawsuit. Several other significant decisions were decided during the survey
period. The Gayton court made clear that the requirement under the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure that expert witnesses be disclosed in answers to
interrogatories in order to testify did not apply to the admission of medical
record affidavits. The courts reached inconsistent results regarding the
amount of testimony necessary to support a jury finding on the prior compensable injury defense. The Greenhalgh court held that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing imposed by Aranda applied retroactively to cases not
final when Aranda was decided. The Garcini court adopted a new test for
measuring loss of vision which is very generous to the claimant.

143. Id at 119.
144. 757 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
145. Id at 80.
146. 674 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ ref'd).
147. Id at 489.
148. 757 S.W.2d at 80.
149. Id at 80. This unusual result created the distinct possibility that a worker would be
entitled to recover damages for loss of vision even in cases where his vision is no worse after
the accident than before. Indeed, any worker not born with 20/20 vision would be able to
demonstrate lost vision under the test adopted in Garcint.

